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What is the role of politics in shaping attitudes about appropriate roles for women in the 
family and the compatibility of work and motherhood? In this paper we argue that the 
German separation and later reunification produced a natural experiment to address this 
question. During the divided years, East German institutions encouraged high levels of full-
time employment for women, including mothers. The West German system by contrast 
deterred women in general, and mothers in particular, from full-time employment. After 
reunification, family-related policies largely converged in the two Germanies. Against this 
background, we empirically investigate gender-role attitudes in reunified Germany. Our 
results show that East Germans are significantly more likely to hold egalitarian or 
nontraditional sex-role attitudes than West Germans. Despite a scenario of partial policy 
convergence, we also find evidence that the gap between East and West German gender role 
attitudes more than doubled in the years after reunification. We suggest that one explanation 
for this divergence could be found in the notion of social identity. 
JEL-Code: J13, J16. 
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We are indebted to Hans Hvide for helpful comments. 1. Introduction
Attitudes and beliefs concerning appropriate roles for men and women in the family
and the workplace inﬂuence economic outcomes. First, there is evidence of a strong
negative correlation between traditional or anti-egalitarian views and female employment
(Thornton et al., 1983; Fortin, 2005). Second, diﬀerences in beliefs about appropriate sex
roles across geographically diﬀerentiated groups turn out to have signiﬁcant explanatory
power for the work and fertility behavior of women (Fernandez and Fogli, 2009). Third,
gender diﬀerences in labor market outcomes are not just the result of discrimination but
also partially reﬂect women’s own beliefs about appropriate gender roles (Fortin, 2005).
Finally, parental sex-role attitudes appear to play a signiﬁcant role in shaping the attitudes
and behavior of children. For example, whether a man’s wife works is positively associated
with whether his mother worked (Fernandez et al., 2004), which could be explained with
the idea that men with working mothers have more egalitarian views of sex roles.
Despite the mounting evidence that sex-role attitudes matter, research on the factors
involved in the formation and the evolution of such attitudes is scarce. In particular, very
little is known about whether individual beliefs about gender roles are endogenous to
politics. In this paper we follow the empirical approach of Alesina and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln
(2007) and argue that the separation and reuniﬁcation of Germany sets up a natural
experiment of sorts concerning the inﬂuence of political regimes and social policies on
attitudes about appropriate roles for women in the family and the compatibility of work
and motherhood. Central to our analysis is the use of West Germans as a control group for
East Germans. The argument for using this approach is as follows. Prior to separation,
East and West Germany were quite similar, amongst other things, in terms of fertility and
female employment rates, suggesting no substantial diﬀerence in gender role attitudes.
Then new political and economic systems were twice imposed in the East, once when
Germany was divided in 1949 and again when it was reuniﬁed in 1990. During the divided
years, institutions and policies that allow women to combine paid work and parenting
diﬀered markedly in the two Germanies. The East German politico-economic system not
only granted women the constitutional right to work and to receive equal pay, but also
encouraged high levels of female employment through extensive public provision of child
care and reduced working hours for mothers (Trappe, 1996). West German institutions
and policies, by contrast, deterred women in general and mothers in particular from
paid work. Those women who chose employment were incentivized—through tax policy
and half-day nurseries—to work part-time (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). After reuniﬁcation,
a scenario of institutional convergence emerged. More precisely, family-related policies
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Against this background, we examine the impact of changing political regimes and
social policies on individual sex-role attitudes. The data we use comes from the German
General Social Survey (ALLBUS). Our ﬁrst set of results shows that individuals in the
eastern part of reuniﬁed Germany are signiﬁcantly more likely to hold egalitarian or
nontraditional sex-role attitudes than their western counterparts. For example, being
from East Germany reduces the likelihood of agreeing with the statement “It is better
for all if the husband works and the wife stays at home taking care of the household and
the children” by roughly 24 percentage points. We interpret this as evidence that the
state socialist system in East Germany had a discernible eﬀect on people’s thinking about
appropriate gender roles. Having established this, we ask of the data whose beliefs are
more important in shaping the East-West gap in sex-role attitudes, men’s or women’s?
We show that the beliefs of both East German men and women play an important role,
though perhaps surprisingly, men’s views appear to be, if anything, more important in
driving the gap in sex-role attitudes between East and West Germany. This could be
explained with the fact that a substantially larger portion of men in the East grew up
with a working mother than in the West.
Lastly, we investigate whether the institutional transformations that took place after
reuniﬁcation—with substantially more change in the East than in the West—are reﬂected
in a convergence of views about gender roles. A remarkable picture emerges. For none
of our outcome variables we ﬁnd evidence of a convergence process. We show quite to
the contrary that there is a widening of the East-West gap in sex-role attitudes over
the period after 1990. This result is not only statistically signiﬁcant and robust across
a number of speciﬁcations, but also quantitatively substantial. For example, regarding
disagreement with the statement “It is more important for a woman to support her hus-
band’s career instead of making her own”, the gap between East and West Germans more
than doubled in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen years after reuniﬁcation. One potential explanation for
this striking divergence in sex-role attitudes could be found in the notion of social identity
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005). East Germans as a social group only began to identify
themselves as such a few years after reuniﬁcation. After that, their identity led them to
hold gender views in concert with the goals of the past socialist regime. The adaption
of increasingly egalitarian gender views after reuniﬁcation could thus be interpreted as
an identity-conserving strategy—one that might reﬂect individuals’ positive evaluation of
the high value given to gender equality under socialism. In that sense, the divergence of
sex-role attitudes in reuniﬁed Germany could be interpreted as a long-term eﬀect of the
3socialist regime in the East.1
Our work is by no means the ﬁrst in the study of preferences and attitudes to exploit
the German separation and later reuniﬁcation. In a seminal paper, Alesina and Fuchs-
Sch¨ undeln (2007) looked at the extent to which the communist regime in East Germany
aﬀected people’s thinking about redistribution from the rich to the poor. They ﬁnd
that East Germans are much more in favor of redistribution than West Germans. They
also detect signs of a convergence process. More precisely, they show that it will take
roughly two generations for the diﬀerence between East and West Germans to disappear.
The present paper demonstrates that the exact opposite—namely a divergence process—
emerged when it comes to individual views of sex roles. In addition to the aforementioned
study focusing on preferences for redistribution, there has been work examining social
capital in reuniﬁed Germany. Rainer and Siedler (2009) show that the communist regime
in East Germany had a negative eﬀect on people’s social and institutional trust. They
also ﬁnd evidence that the transition to democracy led to a sharp increase in institutional
trust amongst East Germans. Finally, Bauernschuster et al. (2009) empirically compare
individuals born and raised under socialism in East Germany to their West Germans
counterparts, and ﬁnd that the socialist regime had a causal eﬀect on attitudes which are
negatively associated with entrepreneurship.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses some back-
ground to the German separation and later reuniﬁcation. Section three of the paper
describes the data we use, and Section four presents the results. Section ﬁve concludes.
2. Institutional Background
2.1. Before Separation
After a period of multiple political and territorial changes, the second half of the 19th
century saw the emergence of gradual conformity between German regions. This devel-
opment found its institutional imprint in the foundation of the German Empire in 1871.
After World War I, the period of the Weimar Republic further supported this develop-
ment. The regions that would later become East and West Germany were parts of one
federal republic. This political and institutional background of Germany is crucial for our
identiﬁcation strategy.
In order to isolate the causal impact of the socialist regime on sex-role attitudes, a key
identifying assumption is that East and West Germans did not diﬀer from each other in
1The historical data reported in this section is available at http://www.digizeitschriften.
de/main=/dms/img/?PPN=PPN514401303 1935.
4terms of gender views prior to German separation. Unfortunately, we do not have data on
reported sex-role attitudes in East and West Germany before separation. However, we do
have historic data on variables that are closely related to sex-role attitudes. These data
should give us at least some impression about sex roles in East and West Germany in the
ﬁrst half of the last century. For example, data from the Statistisches Reichsamt (1936,
p. 322, p. 334) indicate that female labor market participation did hardly diﬀer between
what is today’s East Germany and West Germany. In 1935, 31 percent of all employed
and unemployed were female in the regions of today’s East Germany; in West Germany
this ﬁgure is only slightly lower (30.14 percent). As far as marriage behavior and fertility
is concerned, historical data again support our assumption that East and West Germans
did not systematically diﬀer before separation (Statistisches Reichsamt, 1936, p. 36).
The same is true for female working hours as compared to male working hours and female
wages as compared to male wages (e.g., Statistisches Reichsamt, 1936, p. 342). Sch¨ afgen
(1998) presents complementary statistics to show that in 1955, labor force participation
rate among females was 52.2 percent in East Germany; the corresponding ﬁgure for West
Germany comes from 1960 and is 49 percent. Only in the course of the following decades,
East and West Germans gradually diverged due to orthogonal politico-economic regimes
and family-related policies.
2.2. During the Divided Years
During the divided years, the two Germanies encouraged women to combine paid work and
the family in very diﬀerent ways. In East Germany, the principle of “equal pay for equal
work” was made part of the ﬁrst constitution in 1949. During the 1960s, the policy focus
in the East was on giving women special opportunities to improve their qualiﬁcations.
This orientation came about within the context of an accelerated development of the
economy’s scientiﬁc and technical level (Huinink and Solga, 2007). By the 1970s, the
regime recognized that women’s increasing employment seemed to be associated with
lower fertility rates (Engelhardt et al., 2002). In the latter years of the socialist regime,
the policy focus therefore changed from qualiﬁed employment to the reconciliation of work
and maternity. In addition to providing extensive child care, the implemented policies
made it possible for women to take paid leaves with a job-return guarantee after childbirth
and to reduce working hours while the children were small (Trappe, 1996).
In West Germany, by contrast, combining work and family was diﬃcult for women due
to the lack of public child care (Rosenfeld et al., 2004). Family policy centered around
extended maternal leave for child care, which allowed mothers to stay at home with
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During their time of nonemployment, women’s entitlement’s were largely derived from
their husbands’ rights (Engelhardt et al., 2002). Overall, therefore, West German policy
encouraged a male breadwinner model in which women worked until they had children
and then either stayed at home or returned to part-time work after a long interruption.
Taken together, the discussion so far is suggestive that our comparison of sex-role
attitudes between East and West Germans is embedded in a natural experiment. On the
one hand, the two Germanies diﬀered remarkably in family-related policies and institu-
tions during the forty years of separation. On the other hand, both parts resembled each
other economically, politically and culturally before the exogenously imposed separation
in 1949. If individual beliefs about gender roles are endogenous to political regimes, this
should be visible in diﬀerential sex-role attitudes in the two parts of reuniﬁed Germany.
2.3. After Reuniﬁcation
After reuniﬁcation, family-related policies and institutions largely converged in the two
Germanies. One notable exception is the public supply of child care. On on side, the
institutional transformations that took place after reuniﬁcation led to a slight decrease in
the provision of public child care in the East. However, publicly provided child care in
East Germany nevertheless remained at a higher level than in West Germany (Rosenfeld
et al., 2004). Another notable exception is the percentage of public jobs that are in the
public sector, which was still higher in the East than in the West. Given this scenario
of partial policy convergence, an interesting question to ask is whether a uniﬁcation of
gender role attitudes took place after 1990.
3. Data
The ALLBUS survey (Allgemeine Bev¨ olkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften) is a
valuable data source for our research. ALLBUS is the German equivalent to the U.S.
General Social Survey (GSS) and currently covers the period from 1980 to 2008.2 The
dataset is based on biennial, representative surveys of the German population conducted
through personal interviews. These surveys cover a wide range of topics pivotal to em-
pirical research in social sciences. A core set of questions is asked in every wave of the
2The ALLBUS program was ﬁnancially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) from
1980 to 1986 and in 1991. Further surveys were ﬁnanced on a national and federal state (Laender) level
via the GESIS network (Gesellschaft Sozialwissenschaftlicher Infrastruktureinrichtungen).
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1991, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 waves. In these years, interviewees were asked to
report their level of agreement with six statements about the role of women in families,
where respondents could choose “Fully agree”, “Rather agree”, “Rather don’t agree”, or
“Don’t agree at all” for each single statement. The ﬁrst three statements concern atti-
tudes about the compatibility of work and motherhood, while the other three statements
capture attitudes about the appropriateness of specialization of male and female roles. In
particular, the statements belonging to the ﬁrst group read:
(I) “A working mother can just as well have a hearty and trustful relationship with her
children as a non-working mother”
(II) “It is even good for a child if his or her mother is employed instead of merely focusing
on household work”
(III) “Certainly, a baby would suﬀer if his or her mother is employed”.
On the other hand, the statements referring to appropriateness of segregation of male and
female roles read:
(IV) “It is more important for a woman to support her husband’s career instead of making
her own career”
(V) “It is better for all if the husband works and the wife stays at home taking care of
the household and the children”
(VI) “A married woman should turn a job down if only a limited number of jobs is
available and her husband is able to make a living for the family”.
In order to give a ﬁrst impression of the extent to which East Germans and West Germans
diﬀer in their attitudes towards a woman’s role in the family, we group the two agreement
levels (“Fully agree”, “Rather agree”) together to represent individuals who agree with
the respective statement, and group the two disagreement levels (“Rather don’t agree”, or
“Don’t agree at all) together to capture individuals who do not agree. We then create six
dummy variables which we order so that a value of one reﬂects an egalitarian or nontra-
ditional response and a value of zero represents a traditional orientation. Thus, positive
coeﬃcients on the explaining variables will reﬂect more egalitarian or nontraditional views
about gender roles.
3Terwey and Baltzer (2009) provide detailed information on the ALLBUS surveys in general and
present all variables available in the cumulated dataset from 1980 until 2008.
7The six dummy variables are used as outcome variables of probit regressions where
our independent variable of main interest is a dummy for East Germany. Additionally,
we control for an individual’s gender, age (and its square), and education. Moreover, we
include a set of year dummies to capture common time trends. In addition to the probit
models, we also ran ordered probit models using all information on the four agreement
categories, which did not change our results. In extended speciﬁcations, we also included
marital status, labor force status, occupation, an individual’s monthly income, and, in
order to proxy for wealth, introduce a dummy variable which takes the value of unity for
individuals owning a ﬂat or a house, and is zero otherwise. Moreover, a set of dummy
variables to capture regional size eﬀects (e.g., small village, small town, town, or city) is
used. Including all these additional covariates does not alter our main ﬁndings. However,
they give rise to various endogeneity concerns, which (at least) unnecessarily complicates
the interpretation of the coeﬃcients. This is why in the rest of this paper, we focus on




The results presented in Table 1 show that East Germans hold more egalitarian gender
views than do West Germans. The diﬀerence between East and West in terms of sex-role
attitudes is not only highly signiﬁcant across all six speciﬁcations, but also quantitatively
substantial. Conditional on our controls, being from East Germany increases the like-
lihood of agreeing with the statement “It is even good for a child if his or her mother
is employed instead of merely focusing on household work” by more than 30 percentage
points [speciﬁcation (II)]. Moreover, concerning the statement that “It is better for all if
the husband works and the wife stays at home taking care of the household and the chil-
dren”, being from East Germany decreases the likelihood of agreeing by 24 percentage
points [speciﬁcation (V)]. Note that these diﬀerences between East and West Germans
are averaged over 19 post Reuniﬁcation years. We will later come back to that and an-
alyze the dynamics of these gaps in more detail. The coeﬃcients on our covariates seem
sensible. On average, women hold more modern views about working mothers and their
relationships to their children as well as about family models. Moreover, having rather
traditional attitudes toward working mothers and family models is a u-shaped function
of age. Schooling seems to decrease agreement with more traditional attitudes toward
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level of schooling for all six outcome variables. Additionally, the increasing coeﬃcients
of the year dummies indicate that over the past two decades, individuals adopted more
modern views about working mothers and family models.
So far, we have seen that East Germans are less traditional or more egalitarian than
West Germans when it comes to views about the compatibility of work and motherhood
and the appropriateness of specialization of male and female roles. But it would be
interesting to know more details about the structure of these diﬀerences. First, we might
wonder whether the East Germany dummy is mainly driven by men or women. The
results reported in Table 2 sheds light on this issue. Splitting the sample by gender and
running separate regressions, we ﬁnd that both East German men as well as women diﬀer
in their attitudes from their West German fellow citizens. However, interestingly, for four
out of six outcome variables the coeﬃcient on the East Germany dummy is considerably
larger in the male subsample (second panel of Table 2) than in the female subsample (ﬁrst
panel of Table 2). This leaves us with the conclusion that the gaps between East and
West Germans are to a substantial degree driven by men.
If the observed diﬀerences concerning sex roles are a causal eﬀect of the socialist regime
in the former GDR, we should see these eﬀects in virtually every single federal state of
today’s Eastern Germany. In order to test this prediction, we run regressions where we
include dummies for East Berlin and the ﬁve East German federal states (Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia) rather than
one East Germany dummy; just like in our earlier regressions we use West Germans
as the baseline category. The results of this exercise are displayed in Table 3. As can
be seen, there is evidence that individuals from every single East German federal state
hold a more egalitarian and less traditional gender role attitudes than the average West
German. The coeﬃcients of the remaining covariates are not aﬀected by this alternative
speciﬁcation. It might be interesting to note that West German TV programs could not
be received in parts of Saxony and Mecklenburg Western Pomerania whereas they could
be received in the remaining East German federal states. One might therefore argue that
individuals from Saxony and Mecklenburg Western Pomerania are even more diﬀerent
from West Germans than East Germans from East Berlin, Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt
and Thuringia. Our results do not support this hypothesis.
4In controlling for education, we eliminate any indirect eﬀects that political regimes may have on
gender role attitudes through the education channel. Regimes that promote a male breadwinner model are
less likely to induce female human capital investments than regimes which encourage female employment.
94.2. Family Values and Mobility
Now we switch the focus to those 214 East Germans in our sample who moved to West
Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall and compare them to those individuals who were
born in West Germany and still live there.5 This subpopulation of movers was socialized
in the socialist regime of the former GDR and was then confronted with the economic
and institutional situation of West Germany. The results reported in Table 4 indicate
that this very selective subgroup of East Germans is also signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
average West German for ﬁve out of our six outcome variables. A comparison of the
East-West movers to those who still live in East Germany reveals that—although very
diﬀerent from West Germans—the movers are somewhat less egalitarian than the average
East German. This can be seen from the coeﬃcients of the East-West mover dummy
which are consistently smaller than the East dummies in Table 1. We can interpret this
ﬁnding in two ways: it might be that, once in West Germany, the former East Germans
to a certain degree adopt the gender role attitudes of their West German peers. On the
other hand, there might also be self-selection at play in the sense that those who are more
traditional in terms of family values choose to move from East Germany to West Germany.
Unfortunately, we do not have panel data which would allow us tracking individuals over
time and thus testing these hypotheses more rigorously.
To complete the picture, we perform an anti-test and switch to those 431 individuals in
our sample who moved from East Germany to West Germany before the Berlin Wall was
built. Just as expected, this subgroup does not diﬀer at all from the average West German
in terms of attitudes toward working mothers and family values. Unfortunately, the very
low number of West Germans who moved to East Germany does not allow an analysis
similar to the one for individuals who moved from East Germany to West Germany.
4.3. Cohort Analysis
In a next step, we analyze the gap in sex-role attitudes between East and West Germans
across cohorts. In particular, we deﬁne ﬁve groups according to the year of birth: born
before 1935, born between 1935 and 1945, born between 1945 and 1955, born between
1955 and 1965, and born after 1965. We split the whole sample and run probit regressions
for every cohort subsample, using the dummy for East Germany as our variable of main
interest. All estimations include the usual covariates. The interesting pattern arising
from this exercise is becomes apparent in Table 5. The diﬀerence concerning gender role
5Since this mobility information is not available for 1996 and 2008, we drop all observations from those
years.
10attitudes between East and West Germans is largest for the earliest cohort, and this holds
true for all six outcome variables dealing with either attitudes about the compatibility of
work and motherhood or views about the appropriateness of specialization of male and
female roles. Indeed, we observe a strikingly consistent decrease in the coeﬃcients on the
East dummies once we move to later cohorts. We might interpret this ﬁnding along the
lines of Alesina and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln (2007): those East Germans who lived under the
socialist regime for a longer time show the biggest diﬀerences from West Germans. Given
that the gap between East and West Germans is largest for the earlier cohorts and smaller
for the young, we might also wonder whether we can observe a certain convergence process
in family values between East and West Germans in the years after Reuniﬁcation.
4.4. Dynamics
Since we have got repeated cross-section data on family values for the period from 1991 to
2008, we can explore whether the diﬀerences between East and West Germans decreased
in the course of the years after Reuniﬁcation. In order to analyze whether a convergence
process emerges, we interact the East German dummy with year dummies for 1996, 2000,
2004, and 2008. Then, we include these interaction terms in addition to the East Germany
dummy, the year dummies, and the usual covariates in our probit models. If the coeﬃ-
cients on the interactions show the opposite sign of the East German dummy coeﬃcients,
this indicates the presence of a convergence process of East and West German sex-role
attitudes after reuniﬁcation. On the other hand, if the coeﬃcients of the interactions
show the same signs as the East German dummy coeﬃcients, this would rather indicate
an increase in the gap over the years.
Table 6 depicts the remarkable results of this exercise. In none of the six speciﬁca-
tions, we ﬁnd any evidence at all for an emerging convergence process. Indeed, it rather
seems that East Germans became comparatively more egalitarian than West Germans
after reuniﬁcation. In particular, looking at the results for the interaction terms of the
East dummy and the years 2004 and 2008, we ﬁnd ﬁve out of six coeﬃcients signiﬁcant
with the signs being identical to the ones of the East Germany dummies. This suggests
the existence of a divergence rather than convergence process. Nineteen years after re-
uniﬁcation, East and West Germans diﬀer more from each in terms of gender views than
they used to in 1991 and 1992, i.e., right after reuniﬁcation. At the same time as being
highly signiﬁcant, the magnitude of the divergence seems rather substantial. In speciﬁca-
tion (IV), which deals with the agreement to the statement that it is better for a woman
to support her husband’s career than to make her own career, the gap between East and
11West Germans has virtually more than doubled 15 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall
and even grew further until 2008. But also in speciﬁcations (II), (III), (V), and (VI), we
see a substantial divergence resulting in a maximum of the gap in 2004 that is roughly
1.3 to 1.5 the size of the gap right after Reuniﬁcation. From 2004 to 2008, this gap only
reduced marginally. Further investigating these dynamics, we ﬁnd that both East and
West Germans adopt more egalitarian sex-role attitudes in the course of the 19 years
following German Reuniﬁcation. However, East Germans start out more egalitarian and
follow steeper trend lines towards even less traditional gender views, which ultimately
leads to an increase in the East-West gap. The general picture for the other covariates
remains unaﬀected.
4.5. What Drives the Increase in the Gap?
Given that East and West Germans have been living in one country since 1990, the
persistent and mostly dramatically increasing gap in beliefs about appropriate gender
roles seems puzzling—even more so given that other studies have found at least some
convergence in terms of preferences for redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln, 2007)
and trust (Rainer and Siedler, 2009). Therefore, further investigating this widening of
the gap in family values seems a worthwhile exercise. Are there any persistent, or rather
increasing, diﬀerences in institutions and social policies which might be responsible for the
widening of the gap? In the rest of this paper, we ﬁrst deal with two natural candidates,
i.e., diﬀerences in child care systems and diﬀerences in labor markets. Our analysis,
however, shows that the increase in the gap is unlikely to be driven by these factors. This
is why, ﬁnally, we try to convey the view that social identity may play an important role
in explaining the observed widening of the gap in gender role attitudes.
Childcare. The socialist regime in East Germany built up an elaborated child care
system while there were hardly any day nurseries—in particular for very young children—
in West Germany. This might well have been one channel through which the socialist
regime had an eﬀect on the gender role attitudes of its citizens. Note that many of the
child care centers survived reuniﬁcation and are still in place in today’s East Germany.
However, after reuniﬁcation, if anything, we see a slow convergence in the availability of
day care nursery places in East and West Germany. This is illustrated in Figure 1. The
ﬁgure presents data from the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce showing that the number
of day nursery spaces for children up to 3 years of age per 1,000 children of that age slightly
increased in West Germany, while it stayed on a constant level (or rather decreased) in
12East Germany. This renders child care a rather questionable candidate for explaining the
widening of the gap in sex-role attitudes between West and East Germans.
Labor markets. The labor market situation in the postuniﬁcation era substantially
diﬀered between East and West Germany, with much higher unemployment rates in the
East. Theoretically, the eﬀect of high regional unemployment on gender role attitudes is
ambiguous. On the one hand, high regional unemployment rates might discourage women
from joining the labor force and rather render them housewives, which could in turn lead
to more traditional family values. On the other hand, if high regional unemployment
endangers the job of the husband, a wife might just as well join the labor force and
search for a job herself in order to minimize the negative eﬀects for the family arising
from her husband getting unemployed. The latter hypothesis makes it conceivable that
high unemployment in East Germany may have lead to relatively more egalitarian gender
role attitudes. As can be seen from Figure 2, unemployment statistics indeed show that,
at least in absolute terms, the unemployment rates in East and West Germany diverged
rather than converged from 1991 to 2004, which is exactly the time span where we see
the greatest divergence in sex-role attitudes.
Yet, it is important to note that causality might also run from sex-role attitudes to
unemployment. If people hold the view that a working mother is not harmful to children
or the family, women might look for jobs on the labor market, which in turn increases the
labor force and ceteris paribus the unemployment rate. This makes it diﬃcult to analyze
the causal eﬀect of unemployment on family values. However, if unemployment played a
crucial role in explaining the increasing attitude gap, it seems reasonable to assume that
further divergence from West German family values should be greatest among those East
Germans who are also more likely to be aﬀected by unemployment, i.e., among people in
the working age. Therefore, we now split our sample again by cohorts. In the year 2004,
where we on average see the greatest divergence in the family values gap, those who were
born before 1935 have already reached the retirement age. In contrast, the latest cohort,
which includes those individuals born after 1965, is in the working age throughout the
whole period of observation. We run probit models analyzing the dynamics of the gap for
our earliest and latest cohort separately.
The ﬁndings of this exercise are displayed in Table 7. The cohort in the working age,
which should be aﬀected by the labor market situation, does not show any indications of
divergence at all, which can be seen from the second panel of Table 7. Instead, we observe
a slight convergence—at least for the ﬁrst of the six outcome variables in 2008. In stark
13contrast, the ﬁrst panel of Table 7 illustrates that the oldest generation shows the biggest
diﬀerences not only right after Reuniﬁcation, but that this gap also increases dramatically
in the course of the postuniﬁcation years. This pattern suggests that unemployment
should at least not be the main factor explaining the increasing gap in family values
between East and West Germans after Reuniﬁcation.
As a ﬁnal check of whether diﬀerences in unemployment and childcare systems can
explain the increasing gap in gender role attitudes between East and West Germans, we
include unemployment rates and childcare spaces at a federal state level in our regres-
sions.6 Due to endogeneity concerns, we do not over-interpret these results. However, if
the general picture is conﬁrmed even in this speciﬁcation, this might further strengthen
our point. From Table 8 we can see that the size of the East dummies decreases, yet
they remain highly signiﬁcant across all our outcome variables. The size and signiﬁcance
of the coeﬃcients on the interactions of the East dummies with the year dummies con-
ﬁrms our previous results. Even when controlling for unemployment rates and childcare
spaces, the increasing gap in gender role attitudes between East and West Germans after
Reuniﬁcation remains unexplained.
Social Identity. Given these pieces of evidence, it seems not unreasonable to try the
concept of social identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005) as an alternative explanation
for the increase of the sex-role attitude gap. Consider Figure 3, which illustrates answers
of East German ALLBUS respondents to the question “Do you have feelings of belonging
to the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and its citizens”.7 The ﬁgure clearly
demonstrates that more people felt very strongly or quite strongly attached to the former
GDR in 2000 and 2008 than right after reuniﬁcation. Simple regressions reveal that this
result is driven in particular by people from earlier cohorts whereas the youngest cohort
seems to have weaker emotional ties to the former GDR in 2008 than in 1991. Also
note that the variable measuring these emotional ties is highly correlated with our gender
role attitudes variables.8 One possible line of reasoning is now as follows. After the col-
lapse of the former GDR, the West German politico-economic system was superimposed
upon East Germany, and both East and West Germans were promised a bright future
6Data on childcare spaces for up to three year old children per 1,000 children of that age are available
from the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce for the years 1994, 1998, and 2002. In order to get proxies for
the ratio in 1996, we take the average of the 1994 and 1998 values on a federal state level. Similarly, we
compute the respective ratios for 2000 by taking the means of 1998 and 2002. Moreover, we proxy the
ﬁgures for 1992 (2004) by expanding linear trend lines on the basis of the data from 1994 and 1996 (2000
and 2002).
7The question was only asked in the 1991, 2000, and 2008 surveys.
8The results from these additional regressions are available from the authors upon request.
14in a uniﬁed country. Soon, however, reality proved that the process of growing together
would be more demanding than sometimes expected. East Germany was confronted with
unemployment, which was virtually absent during the socialist regime, and even more,
unemployment rates in East Germany reached double the level of West Germany. Disillu-
sioned by reality, East Germans began to identify themselves as a social group. Although
the communist regime was unmasked as a regime of suppression and injustice, there were
a few aspects that were considered to be worthwhile achievements. One of them was the
elaborated childcare system and another the role of women in society.9 It is striking to ﬁnd
convergence in redistributional preferences and other attitudes between East and West
Germans, yet an impressive divergence for exactly those beliefs that are associated with
the arguably positive aspects of the former socialist regime. The divergence in sex-role
attitudes we observe might therefore reﬂect an identity-conserving behavior, one through
which East Germans hold up the values central to their past, in particular those related
to areas where the positive achievements of the socialist regime are generally accepted.
As a ﬁnal caveat we should note that using our repeated cross-sectional data, we cannot
completely rule out that, at least to some degree, these results might also be driven by a
selection process, where East Germans not attached to the former GDR are more likely
to have moved to West Germany.10
5. Conclusion
There is evidence showing that attitudes and beliefs concerning appropriate roles for men
and women in the family and the workplace inﬂuence economic outcomes. However, little
is known about the formation and evolution of such beliefs. In particular, it is not clear
to what degree politics aﬀects sex-role attitudes.
Drawing upon German separation and reuniﬁcation as a natural experiment, we show
that the socialist regime in the former GDR had a causal impact on sex-role attitudes.
After more than four decades of separation, East Germans exhibit far more egalitarian or
nontraditional gender role attitudes than their western counterparts. Strikingly, despite a
scenario of partial policy convergence, we ﬁnd that the gap in sex-role attitudes between
East and West Germans dramatically increased in the years after reuniﬁcation. Thus, we
identify a remarkable divergence process underneath political uniﬁcation of Germany. We
9In West Germany, there have been lively discussions for years about increasing childcare resources
and thus allowing women to combine both having a family and a career. However, the childcare system
in today’s West Germany is still far from being elaborated.
10Unfortunately, the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) does not cover the sex role attitude
variables we are interested in.
15suggest that this pattern might be explained with a notion of social identity.
Our ﬁndings have important implications for a wide range of politico-economic issues.
Political regimes can shape values and attitudes and have long-term eﬀects on these
attitudes even if a regime itself is no longer in place. Consequently, establishing a common
political ground in historically divided regions is not a panacea for creating a convergence
of attitudes. What does this mean for one-ﬁts-all politics? For example, when it comes to
voting on EU legislation, do member states hold up their very special and typical values
and opt against centralized interference in some speciﬁc ﬁelds? Which issues are more
sensitive to these problems of ﬁnding consensus? Our results make it conceivable that
attitudes are historically shaped and not easily manipulated even in the presence of a
general political convergence process.
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Table 1: Determinants of Attitudes toward Working Mothers and Family Models  
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
East  .153 ***  .308 ***  .287 ***  .096 ***  .241 ***  .146 *** 
  .005 .007 .008 .007 .007 .008 
Female  .054 ***  .161 ***  .092 ***  .023 ***  .080 ***  .073 *** 
  .005 .007 .007 .007 .007 .007 
Age  .004 ***  .009 ***  -.000  -.000  .003 ***  .005 *** 
  .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
Age squared (*10²)  -.004 ***  -.011 ***  -.003 ***  -.005 ***  -.010 ***  -.011 *** 
  .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 
Lower secundary education  .066 ***  .081 ***  .039  .117 ***  .117 ***  .080 *** 
  .015 .025 .026 .021 .024 .024 
Medium secundary education  .091 ***  .129 ***  .107 ***  .199 ***  .225 ***  .180 *** 
  .013 .025 .026 .018 .022 .023 
Higher secundary education  .118 ***  .207 ***  .177 ***  .273 ***  .340 ***  .315 *** 
  .011 .024 .027 .014 .018 .019 
Other  .071 ***  .116 **  .106 **  .151 ***  .225 ***  .218 *** 
  .023 .049 .054 .029 .033 .034 
Pupil  .099 ***  .134 ***  .056  .189 ***  .277 ***  .210 *** 
  .016 .046 .050 .024 .027 .035 
Year 1992  .018 **  .012  .036 ***  -.052 ***  -.026 **  .032 *** 
  .008 .013 .013 .012 .013 .013 
Year 1996  .032 ***  .049 ***  .050 ***  .013 ***  .033 ***  .091 *** 
  .008 .013 .013 .012 .013 .012 
Year 2000  .050 ***  .113 ***  .115 ***  .022 ***  .030 **  .163 *** 
  .008 .013 .013 .011 .013 .011 
Year 2004  .033 ***  .175 ***  .223 ***  .121 ***  .136 ***  .176 *** 
  .008 .013 .014 .010 .012 .011 
Year 2008  .068 ***  .232 ***  .283 ***  .118 ***  .151 ***  .191 *** 
    .008 .012 .013 .010 .012 .011 
N  19,950 19,278 19,804 19,340 19,774 19,463 
Log likelihood  -8,562  -11,922  -11,934 -10,585 -11,513 -11,670 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Omitted categories are West Germany, male, no 
secondary education, and year 1991. Robust standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level of significance, ** 
5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. 
 
  18Table 2: The East-West Gaps by Gender 
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
Female subsample           
East  .121 ***  .273 ***  .266 ***  .097 ***  .244 ***  .136 *** 
 .006  .010  .011  .009  .010  .010 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 10,355  9,990  10,259  10,056  10,220  10,038 
Log likelihood  -4,090  -6,136  -6,339 -5,459 -5,821  -5,865 
            
Male subsample           
East  .189 ***  .339 ***  .307 ***  .094 ***  .238 ***  .157 *** 
 .007  .011  .011  .010  .011  .011 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 9,595  9,288  9,545  9,284  9,554  9,425 
Log likelihood  -4,446  -5,759  -5,573 -5,113 -5,679  -5,797 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Included as controls are gender, age (and its 
square), and dummies for education and years. Robust standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level of 
significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. 
 
  19Table 3: Determinants of Attitudes toward Women and Family Models – Federal States Specification 
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
East Berlin  .115 ***  .290 ***  .292 ***  .161 ***  .298 ***  .220 *** 
  .009 .018 .022 .016 .014 .018 
Brandenburg  .130 ***  .307 ***  .296 ***  .106 ***  .212 ***  .162 *** 
  .006 .012 .015 .012 .012 .013 
Mecklenburg W.Pomerania  .120 ***  .326 ***  .363 ***  .118 ***  .245 ***  .168 *** 
  .007 .013 .016 .014 .014 .016 
Saxony  .119 ***  .274 ***  .260 ***  .086 ***  .212 ***  .101 *** 
  .005 .010 .012 .010 .010 .012 
Saxony-Anhalt  .118 ***  .292 ***  .306 ***  .084 ***  .239 ***  .131 *** 
  .006 .012 .014 .012 .011 .013 
Thuringia  .117 ***  .265 ***  .274 ***  .042 ***  .177 ***  .139 *** 
  .006 .013 .015 .014 .013 .014 
Covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  19,950 19,278 19,804 19,340 19,774 19,463 
Log likelihood  -8,559  -11,912  -11,918 -10,565 -11,488 -11,650 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Included as controls are gender, age (and its 
square), and dummies for education and years. Robust standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level of 
significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. 
 
  20Table 4: Attitudes toward Women and Family Models of East German Movers 
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
East-West mover dummy  .105 ***  .223 ***  .258 ***  .051  .129 ***  .140 *** 
 .029  .044  .046  .042  .046  .043 
Female  .088 ***  .179 ***  .109 ***  .013  .057 ***  .073 *** 
 .011  .013  .012  .012  .013  .013 
Age  .007 ***  .015 ***  .004 *  .000  .005 **  .010 *** 
 .002  .002  .002  .002  .002  .002 
Age squared (*10²)  -.008 ***  -.019 ***  -.009 ***  .023 ***  -.015 ***  -.018 *** 
 .002  .002  .002  .002  .002  .002 
Lower secundary education  .093 **  .127 *  -.081  .010  .086  .111 * 
 .042  .067  .052  .053  .065  .061 
Medium secundary education  .133 ***  .215 ***  -.013  .108 **  .223 ***  .221 *** 
 .035  .068  .053  .048  .060  .055 
Higher secundary education  .182 ***  .293 ***  .071  .216 ***  .349 ***  .361 *** 
 .031  .066  .056  .040  .052  .046 
Other  .140 ***  .217 *  .084  .079  .189 *  .284 *** 
 .047  .119  .117  .086  .098  .071 
Pupil  .160 ***  .264 ***  -.023  .079  .206 ***  .275 *** 
 .030  .089  .076  .072  .078  .059 
Year 1992  .010  -.001  .007  -.069 ***  -.055 ***  .012 
 .015  .019  .018  .018  .019  .019 
Year 2000  .066 ***  .098 ***  .055 ***  .033 *  .025  .152 *** 
 .014  .019  .018  .017  .020  .018 
Year 2004  .043 ***  .128 ***  .149 ***  .126 ***  .130 ***  .171 *** 
   .015  .020  .020  .016  .020  .019 
N  6,453 6,237 6,433 6,282 6,417 6,318 
Log likelihood  -3,326  -3,931  -3,647 -3,335 -3,801 -3,778 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Omitted categories are born and living in West 
Germany, male, no secondary education, and year 1991. Robust standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level 




  21Table 5: The East-West Gaps by Cohort 
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
Cohort -1935          
East  .210 ***  .417 ***  .340 ***  .192 ***  .365 ***  .235 *** 
 .012  .015  .015  .016  .015  .016 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 4,247  4,064  4,220  4,043  4,219  4,099 
Log likelihood  -2,092  -2,335  -2,170 -2,656 -2,410 -2,495 
            
Cohort 1935-1945          
East  .170 ***  .320 ***  .324 ***  .159 ***  .315 ***  .177 *** 
 .012  .017  .017  .016  .017  .018 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3,477  3,372  3,445  3,360  3,432  3,389 
Log likelihood  -1,489  -2,086  -1,956 -2,044 -2,095 -2,178 
            
Cohort 1945-1955          
East  .128 ***  .259 ***  .263 ***  .035 **  .168 ***   .098 *** 
 .012  .018  .019  .017  .018  .018 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 3,480  3,374  3,463  3,379  3,448  3,415 
Log likelihood  -1,371  -2,123  -2,134 -1,828 -2,064 -2,082 
            
Cohort 1955-1965          
East  .138 ***  .249 ***  .235 ***  .016  .144 ***  .091 *** 
 .011  .017  .017  .014  .015  .016 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 4,327  4,205  4,300  4,226  4,290  4,240 
Log likelihood  -1,732  -2,631  -2,782 -2,037 -2,424 -2,409 
            
Cohort 1965-          
East  .113 ***  .264 ***  .239 ***  .031 **  .128 ***  .085 *** 
 .011  .016  .017  .013  .014  .015 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 4,416  4,262  4,373  4,329  4,383  4,319 
Log likelihood  -1,835  -2,669  -2,805 -1,908 -2,400 -2,421 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Included as controls are gender, age (and its 
square), and dummies for education and years. Robust standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level of 
significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. 
 
  22Table 6: Dynamics of Attitudes toward Working Mothers and Family Models 
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
East  .153 ***  .266 ***  .222 ***  .045 ***  .208 ***  .113 *** 
 .008  .013  .013  .012  .012  .013 
East * 1996  -.009  .060 **  .075 ***  .068 ***  .072 ***  .038 * 
 .019  .023  .023  .018  .022  .022 
East * 2000  -.003  .028  .089 ***  .032 *  .011  .063 *** 
 .018  .023  .023  .019  .022  .022 
East * 2004  .020  .121 ***  .131 ***  .108 ***  .089 ***  .068 *** 
 .018  .025  .025  .019  .024  .024 
East * 2008  -.009  .097 ***  .115 ***  .122 ***  .072 ***  .042 * 
 .020  .025  .024  .018  .024  .024 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 19,950  19,278  19,804  19,340  19,774  19,463 
Log likelihood  -8,561  -11,906  -11,913 -10,559 -11,502 -11,664 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Included as controls are gender, age (and its 
square), and dummies for education and years. Robust standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level of 
significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. 
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Baden-Wuerttemberg (W) Bavaria (W) Hesse (W)
Lower Saxonia (W) Northrhine Westfalia (S) Rhineland Palatinate (W)
Saarland (W) Schleswig-Holstein (W) Thuringia (E)
Saxonia (E) Saxonia-Anhalt (E) Mecklenburg Western Pomerania (E)
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the development of childcare spaces for up to 3 year old children per 1,000 children of 
that age on a federal state level. East German federal states are represented by solid lines, whereas West German 
federal states are represented by dotted lines; the y-axis is log-scaled. Data source: German Federal Statistical 
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Notes: The figure shows the development of unemployment rates (in percent) in East and West Germany. Data 





  25Table 7: Dynamics of the East-West Gap by Cohorts 
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV)  (V)  (VI) 
Cohort -1935          
East dummy  .186 ***  .369 ***  .249 ***  .086 ***  .315 ***  .158 *** 
 .017  .024  .023  .025  .024  .025 
East * 1996  .080 **  .126 **  .102 **  .181 ***  .116 **  .106 ** 
 .033  .049  .046  .044  .048  .047 
East * 2000  .018  .032  .129 ***  .112 **  .026  .130 *** 
 .040  .048  .047  .046  .045  .048 
East * 2004  .088 **  .149 **  .275 ***  .231 ***  .113 *  .204 *** 
 .040  .064  .063  .053  .060  .060 
East * 2008  .023  .112 *  .267 ***  .316 ***  .175 ***  .155 *** 
 .051  .064  .063  .047  .062  .060 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 4,247  4,064  4,220  4,043  4,219  4,099 
Log likelihood  -2,088  -2,329  -2,151 -2,633 -2,403 -2,486 
            
Cohort 1965-          
East dummy  .158 ***  .252 ***  .260 ***  .015  .140 ***  .089 *** 
 .023  .036  .039  .029  .031  .033 
East * 1996  -.085  -.014  -.008  .006  -.011  .039 
 .061  .061  .061  .043  .055  .063 
East * 2000  -.062  -.001  -.052  -.020  -.063  -.058 
 .054  .055  .054  .042  .052  .048 
East * 2004  -.080  .052  .002  .042  .032  .039 
 .054  .056  .055  .035  .048  .046 
East * 2008  -.112 **  .018  -.040  .045  -.016  -.027 
 .056  .055  .053  .033  .049  .049 
Covariates Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 4,416  4,262  4,373  4,329  4,383  4,319 
Log likelihood  -1,833  -2,669  -2,804 -1,906 -2,398 -2,419 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Included as controls are gender, age (and its 
square), and dummies for education and years. Robust standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level of 













  26Table 8: Dynamics of the East-West Gap with Regional Controls 
   Mothers and work  Women in the family 
   I  II  III  IV  V  VI 
East  .121 ***  .170 ***  .117 ***  .068 **  .173 ***  .103 *** 
  .020 .031 .030 .028 .030 .030 
East * 1996  -.016  .071 ***  .068 **  .050 **  .056 **  .021 
  .023 .027 .027 .023 .027 .026 
East * 2000  -.020  .026  .063 **  .016  -.019  .045 * 
  .024 .028 .027 .025 .029 .027 
East * 2004  .002  .116 ***  .101 ***  .098 ***  .059 *  .047 
  .024 .030 .030 .024 .030 .029 
Unemployment rate  .004 **  .005 **  .006 **  -.002  .004  .001 
  .002 .003 .003 .002 .003 .003 
Childcare spaces (*10²)  .005  .015 **  .019 ***  .005  .009  .007 
  .006 .007 .007 .007 .007 .007 
Other  covariates  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  13,551 13,058 13,441 13,103 13,410 13,208 
Log likelihood  -5,918  -8,080  -7,982 -7,264 -7,815 -7,934 
Notes: The table reports probit marginal effects where the columns I) to VI) correspond to the six dummy 
outcome variables discussed in the text. Positive coefficients on the explaining variables are associated with 
more egalitarian or non-traditional views about gender roles. Included as controls are gender, age (and its 
square), dummies for education and years, the unemployment rate at the federal state level, and the number of 
childcare spaces for up to three years old children per 1,000 children of that age at the federal state level. Robust 
standard errors are given in italics. *** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of 
significance. 
  27Figure 3: East Germans’ emotional ties to the former GDR 
 
Notes: The graph represents answers of people living in East Germany to the question “Do you have feelings of 
belonging to the former GDR and its citizens?". Respondents could choose one out of four categories, namely 
„very strong“, “quite strong”, „less strong“, or “not at all”. 
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Appendix 1: Summary statistics 
      West  East  Total 
Gender       
 Male  6,425  3,425  9,850 
   48.78 47.76 48.42 
 Female  6,746  3,747  10,493 
   51.22 52.24 51.58 
 Total  13,171  7,172  20,343 
   100.00 100.00 100.00 
Education        
  No  secondary  326 152 478 
   2.48 2.13 2.36 
 Lower  secondary  6,082  2,489  8,571 
   46.31 34.81 42.26 
 Medium  secondary  3,287  3,053  6,340 
   25.03 42.70 31.26 
 Higher  secondary  3,241  1,354  4,595 
   24.68 18.94 22.65 
 Other  70  66  136 
   0.53 0.92 0.67 
 Pupil  127  36  163 
   0.97 0.50 0.80 
 Total  13,133  7,150  20,283 
   100.00 100.00 100.00 
Birth  Cohort       
 -1935  2,767  1,599  4,366 
   21.04 22.31 21.49 
 1935-1945  2,152  1,372  3,524 
   16.37 19.15 17.35 
 1945-1955  2,212  1,319  3,531 
   16.82 18.41 17.38 
 1955-1965  2,877  1,516  4,393 
   21.88 21.16 21.62 
 1965-  3,142  1,360  4,502 
   23.89 18.98 22.16 
 Total  13,150  7,166  20,316 
   100.00 100.00 100.00 
Age        
 Mean  46.87  47.64  47.14 
 Std.  dev.  17.35  16.95  17.21 
   N  13,150  7,166  20,316 
Notes: Unless otherwise specified, the figures show number of observations in each cell; percentage shares are 
given in italics.  
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